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IN THE UTAH STATE COURT OF APPEALS 
OLGA LUCIA GRINDSTAFF, ; 
Appellant, ] 
v. ] 
ROBERT LEE GRINDSTAFF, ; 
Appellee. ] 
) REPLY BRIEF OF APPELLANT 
) Appeal No. 20090505 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
This is a custody case between two good parents where the trial Judge adopted the 
legal conclusion of the custody evaluator and both applied the wrong standard. Everyone 
involved in this case, from the Domestic Relations Commissioner, GAL, Custody Evaluator, 
to the District Court Judge found this case to involve two good parents, and a "very close 
call." The custody evaluator and the Judge found the "most important factor" to be 
maintaining the children in their community. The divorce was granted without fault. 
The defendant's statement of the case and statement of the facts is, at best, an 
attempt at creative writing. In so many ways, Olga fits a stereotype: a thick tongued Latina 
who married a gringo to get her green card and then dumps him for a flashy salesman from 
Las Vegas. It makes a good story and it is juicy gossip. It is simply not true. Robert 
continually attempted to demonize and impugn the Petitioner. But the truth of the character 
evidence is that Robert is the one that lied to the custody evaluator (ex. R. 0694, p. 345 line 
15 - 346 line 8), engaged in illegal wiretapping of his wife (R. 0694 p.33 line 4 et seq.), and 
was three times found in contempt of the Court. 
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This case is on appeal because the Court made improper decisions regarding the best 
interests of the minor children, as the children currently are left unattended in the mornings, 
and are "warehoused" in the afternoons; all the while this very good mother is at home 24 
hours a day being a homemaker. That does not appear to be the type of discretion that this 
Court has entrusted to the trial Courts. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
1. Olga filed a Petition seeking a divorce and custody of the parties five minor 
children. She also filed a motion for temporary custody. Robert filed an Answer and 
affidavit, alleging physically abusive conduct on the part of mother toward the children. The 
parties agreed '"Based on [Robert's] allegations of physical abuse, to have the Court appoint a 
GAL." (R. 0689 p. 3). A continuance was based solely on Robert's allegations. 
2. After his review, the GAL reported there had been a DCFS investigation. The 
investigation resulted in an "unsupported finding." (R. 0690 p.7).He did not believe there 
was a danger of any physical issues (R. 0691, p9 111-4). 
3. Although the claim of Olga being abusive continued to be raised by Robert, 
after the De Novo hearing of March 23, 2007, the Court held: "I'm not particularly 
concerned about the previous allegations of abuse and, and neglect. Having had the 
circumstances explained to me a, I'm just not satisfied on any basis that there's a continuing 
concern for danger to the children from the mother's behavioral parenting." (R. 0691 p.118). 
4. In T}6 of his brief, Robert claims that "Olga decided to end the marriage 
because she felt that she was about to be successful in her Herbal Life business, and she did 
not want to share her success with the father." That's not what the record states. 
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5. Olga filed for divorce and custody because the family was being evicted from 
their rental tenement and Robert would not disclose what the plans were. R. 180 par 12. She 
feared homelessness. R. 693 p 31, 11 4-25 - p32, 11 1-11. She knew he wanted to move to 
public housing in South Provo R. 693, p29, 1122-25 and she wanted something better for her 
children. The divorce was already a foregone conclusion and it was the uncertainly caused by 
Robert that forced Olga to take action at that time. 
6. Olga is critici2ed for having abandoned the family by securing and sleeping in 
a studio apartment. (Appellee's Brief p.9, TJ13). This was after Robert moved the family of 10, 
plus his mother, to a small 4 bedroom house in Orem. (R.694 line 18-25). Olga was in the 
home, every day, taking care of the children from the time they got up until they went to 
bed. (R. 694 p. 74). Then she would go to her apartment to sleep. 
7. In the hearing for temporary Orders, Commissioner Patton evicted Olga from 
the home. (R.228 #8). After being excluded from the family home, Olga and her three 
children went to Vegas (a decision supported by Judge Taylor 694, p 501, 1119-23). While 
Robert claimed this as abandonment, the Court saw it as a great move for Olga and her 
family. 
8. Yes, Olga had a suitor waiting in the wings, and she "married up." Regarding 
marrying Tom Bradley and moving to Las Vegas, the Trial Court said: "Relocating with two 
of her older children to Las Vegas to live in a home provided by Mr. Bradley was very 
sensible in that she and those two children were in immediately and dramatically better 
circumstances." (R. 0553). 
9. Robert claims "At the hearing on March 23, 2007, Judge Taylor awarded the 
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father temporary custody during the school year, awarded the mother parent-time during the 
summer, and made other orders incident thereto." (Emphasis added). That is not what the 
record shows. Judge Taylor overruled the commissioner regarding the issue of sole custody 
of the children to father. He said: "I'm going to order that from this point that the parents 
have joint legal custody. I think that's appropriate. They both have an ongoing relationship, 
concern and care for the children. I'm going to order that physical custody of the children 
remain with their father until the end of the school year. . . . After the school year ends this 
year, custody, physical custody, will shift to mother who will have custody through the 
summer." (R. 694 p. 119). 
ARGUMENT 
I. THE TRIAL COURT FAILED TO APPROPRIATELY APPLY AND 
WEIGH THE CUSTODY FACTORS 
Olga believes that the trial Court failed to properly weigh the relevant custody factors 
in awarding sole custody to Robert. 
In Hutchison v. Hutchison. 649 P.2d 38, 41 (Utah 1982), the Supreme Court itemized 
and affirmed some 13 separate factors that the Courts should evaluate in determinating 
custody. The relative weight of the various factors was left to the discretion of the trial court. 
See also: Jorgensen v. Jorgensen. Utah, 599 P.2d 510, 512 (1979)." Id. at 41. However, 
despite the Appellate Courts' desire to defer to the Trial Courts, the application of the 
factors and the relative weight to be given to each continues to be abused by the trial Court. 
As the policy has developed, the appellate courts have directed that all factors are not 
equally weighted. In Pusey v. Pusey. 728 P.2d 117 (Utah 1986), the Utah Supreme Court 
stated that: 
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"[T]hat the choice in competing child custody claims should instead be based on 
function-related factors. Prominent among these, though not exclusive, is the identity of the 
primary caretaker during the marriage. Other factors should include the identity of the parent 
with greater flexibility to provide personal care for the child..." (Emphasis added). 
See also: Davis v. Davis. 749 P.2d 647 (Utah 1988). 
Appellee now claims that this Court has long recognized that stability for the children 
trumps the "primary caretaker" factor, citing Erwin V. Erwin. 773 P2d 847; 108 Utah Adv 
Rep 55; 1989 Utah App LEXIS 731. The Erwin Court did not so hold. In that case, the 
Court was concerned with instability of mother's residence, relationships, keeping the 
children together and fostering sibling bonds, open cohabitation, and the mother's past and 
present demonstrated moral standards (all of which weighed in favor of father). In this case, 
at the time of the trial, Olga was remarried, living in an owned home with her husband Tom, 
and three children Juan, Olguita, and Mary Catherine. She was financially secure, and her 
living arrangements were more secure than Robert who was living in a rental apartment, 
using various forms of welfare and community assistance. 
The overwhelming weight of authority direct that the primary caretaker and which 
parent with greater flexibility to provide personal care for the child, are prominent factors. 
And yet, in this case, there was none. The Court said: "Both of these parties were equally 
engaged in the care and nurturing of these children before the divorce. (R. 0557). The Court 
might just as well have said: "I reject your reality and substitute my own." There is no 
analysis, no finding of fact, on this prominent issue. And it is an interesting statement in light 
of the fact much of the time Robert was working two jobs (R. 693 p. 99 1113- 23), and at the 
time of trial, was committed to surrogate care both before and after school. Both the Judge 
and the Commissioner had previously found Mother to be the primary caretaker, and Robert 
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and Olga both so testified. 
But in this case, Dr. Jensen, the custody evaluator, stated that the most important 
factor in this case was keeping the children in their community.1 That claim was previously 
rejected by this Court in Larsen v. Larsen. 888 P.2d 719 (Utah Ct. App. 1994), discussed 
infra. 
The trial Court stated that Dr. Jensen's findings and observations were "adopted in 
full." (R. 0560^1 2). It is one thing to allow the custody evaluator to assist the finder of fact in 
determining and evaluating facts. It is plain error to allow the expert to make legal 
conclusion, such as the "most important factor" to decide the case. Especially when he 
applies the wrong law. 
This case is more closely related to Larsen v. Larsen. 888 P.2d 719 (Utah Ct. App. 
1994), cited to this Court in our principal brief. In Larsen, this Court determined that the 
Trial Court erred in awarding Custody to father on the grounds that mother's move from 
Park City to Oregon, to marry, would not be in the children's best interest, as it would inhibit 
father's ability to maintain a parental relationship with his children, disrupt their religious 
training, and remove them from their friends and relatives. This Court determined that: 
i 
24) Q. Okay. Now getting back to my initial question on this. What, what determination did 
you make regarding that (p. 0284) factor's impact on, on your evaluation? 
2) A. It a, the, the factor of greatest impact was, probably pertained less to the orders, a, 
and more to the duration of time that the children had their, the children's integration a, 
were the, the factors pertaining to the kids' happiness and adjustment, a, stability of residence 
which were, which are factors imbedded in this criterion. The friendship relationships. 
integration with schools, a. church and community, a. that were established in the a. here in 
the, in the Provo area. 
(R. 0694 p. 0283, 0284) (Emphasis added). 
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"The focus of the trial court's analysis and decision, then, was not on the parties' 
respective parenting skills. 3 Instead, the court's order can only be taken to mean that the 
trial court believed that the children's domicile in Summit County is so essential to their 
well-being that removal from that community would be more detrimental to them than 
separating them from their custodial parent—the person who has been primarily responsible 
for their day-to-day care for the entirety of their lives. While such a conclusion is not 
inherently impossible, a factor of considerable importance in determining the best interest of 
children is the maintenance of continuity in their lives, and removing children from their 
existing custodial placement undercuts that policy. 4 (string cite omitted). Therefore, unless 
there were compelling evidence that residing in Summit County, Utah, would be better for 
the children than allowing them to continue to reside with their life-long primary caregiver, 
we would conclude that the trial court exceeded the exercise of sound discretion in entering 
the order before us." 
(n. 3. It is undisputed that both Alicia and Marc are exemplary parents, each deeply 
committed to the well-being of their children." 
n.4. In any event, especially in the case of younger children, the disruption of moving 
with their life-long primary caregiver would usually be less detrimental than a sudden change 
in who is serving that important role. Such disruption might be exacerbated in this case by 
the fact that Marc's long work hours would necessitate the use of surrogate care, which has 
not been present in the children's lives heretofore, although Marc testified that he would cut 
back on his work hours if he had custody of the children.)" 
Larsen, at 722 (Emphasis added) 
In this case, the Court failed to properly weigh and apply the custody factors, had he 
done so, the Court would have made a different decision regarding Custody. 
At the January 16, 2007, hearing, the trial court did find that Olga being the primary 
caretaker weighed in her favor. Tr. at p. 50. Similarly, at the March 23, 2007, hearing, the trial 
court acknowledged Olga was in a better situation to care for the Children, as she could 
provide full time constant care. Id. In both referenced hearings, the Court found no abuse 
issues. These findings became the "law of the case." Yet, without notice or an opportunity to 
address the issue, the Court changes his mind after trial. 
Olga has greater flexibility to provide personal care for the children. Robert leaves for 
work at about 5:00 a.m. while the Children sleep. (R.0694 p.22). Robert would return home 
at about 7:30 am to get the Children to school and make sure the youngest Child was taken 
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care of. (R.0694 pp. 22-23). At Trial, Robert testified similarly, that he does not have 
someone at the house watching the Children while he is working in the morning before he 
comes back to get them. Tr. at p. 436. Robert also testified the younger Children are in 
daycare and the older Children attend after school programs until 5:30. Tr. at pp. 424, 428, 
429, 444. Dr. Jensen testified that he understood that a surrogate caretaker was present with 
the children in the morning, and that if they were unattended, that would be "inappropriate." 
(R.0694 p.345 1. 2 - 346 1.8) 
That is not to say that other factors cannot (or should not) be considered. In Hansen 
v. Hansen. 2009 UT App. 365, this Court held that the primary caretaker is not the single 
controlling factor, and while more heavily weighted than other factors, must yield where 
multiple showings in other areas override the primary caretaker factor. 
Judge Davis' dissent in Hansen, raises an important issue in such cases, "Reversal 
would have little, if any, effect on Mother's ability to obtain a change of custody," apparently 
because the error committed by the Trial Court has resulted in a de facto reversal in the 
primary caretaker status of the parties so on remand, the erroneous judgment would be 
affirmed. That means that the Trial Court (and by assignment, the Custodial Evaluator) are 
authorized to amend the test at will, because under the current law, the failure to properly 
weigh and apply the primary caretaker factor becomes non-appealable, because there is no 
remedy. A remedy for that problem would be to disregard the factor of primary custody 
pending trial or hearing in cases of remand, and look only toward the historical primary 
caretaker. 
The trial court failed to set forth objective findings of fact that Robert was the better 
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parent to care for the Children and further failed in its basic facts as to why such a 
conclusion was justified. Sukin v. Sukin. 842 P.2d 922, at 924. (Utah Ct. App. 1992). 
Respondent has claimed that Dr. Jensen spent three pages analyzing the primary 
caretaker factor. (Appellee's brief, p. 22). Even a cursory review of the written evaluation 
shows this is not true. Under the tide "General Interests of Continuing Previously Determined custody 
Arrangements'' neither the primary caretaker role nor any analysis of which parent could 
provide personal as opposed to surrogate care was mentioned. What was analyzed was 
Michelle's treatment for Selective Mutism who the best treatment provider might be. 
Ultimately, the evaluator said that three of the five children thought Michelle responded 
move favorably to the father's approach, which apparentiy meant he was the better caretaker 
in the eyes of three of five children under 10 yoa. The court never properly weighted the 
function related factors of primary caretaker and which parent had greater flexibility to 
provide personal care for the child. 
Accordingly, this Court should reverse the determination of custody in this matter. 
II. THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN ITS EXCLUSION 
OF APPELLANT'S EXPERT WITNESS. 
A. Dr. Hopper was prepared to Rebut Dr. Jensen's findings in the 
Custody Evaluation Report. 
UTAH CODE OF JUD. ADMIN. R. 4-903(7)states as follows: 
In cases in which psychological testing is employed as a component of 
the evaluation, it shall be conducted by a licensed psychologist who is trained 
in the use of the tests administered, and adheres to the ethical standards for 
the use and interpretation of psychological tests in the jurisdiction in which he 
or she is licensed to practice. If psychological testing is conducted with adults 
and/or children, it shall be done with knowledge of the limits of the testing 
and should be viewed within the context of information gained from clinical 
interviews and other available data. Conclusions drawn from psychological 
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testing should take into account the inherent stresses associated with divorce 
and custody disputes. 
In the instant case, Dr. Hopper was called in anticipation of trial to testify as a mixed 
fact and expert witness. R0491. He had been providing care to Michelle in Las Vegas and 
had evaluated Olga. In her disclosure of Dr. Hopper's proposed testimony, Olga stated as 
follows: 
Dr. Hopper has indicated that he has reviewed the report of Dr. Jensen, which fails to 
mention or utilize any of the testing conducted. Dr. Hopper has indicated that he feels it is 
not very thorough where it counts and heavy on attacks on [Olga], without reference for any 
factual cause. He also said he found as strange the complete lack of mention of all the tests 
the parties took. He thought the attacks on Olga, without any clinical or factual evidence to 
support them, were unprofessional and outside the standard of the profession. He has 
requested all testing materials, but has been delayed (or denied) by Dr. Jensen. His opinions 
are subject to a final review of additional documentation to be provided by Dr. Jensen. Id. 
Dr. Hopper was expected to rebut Dr. Jensen's anticipated findings concerning 
Olga's psychological testing. Dr. Hopper's anticipated testimony was crucial to Olga's case, 
particularly since Dr. Jensen's findings were adopted by the trial court in its Memorandum, 
Findings and Conclusions, and Order. Accordingly, the main issue regarding Dr. Hopper's 
testimony became whether his scientific, technical, or other specialized knowledge would 
assist the trial court to determine facts at issue, facts central to an award of custody. UT. R. 
EVID. 702(a) and (b). See Advisory Committee Note, \ 2: "Similarly, the expert is viewed, 
not in a narrow sense, but as a person qualified by "knowledge, skill, experience, training or 
education". 
Robert argued Dr. Hopper was incompetent as a custody evaluator under Rule 493, 
which provides only for social workers or licensed, doctorate level psychologists, or those 
state licensed where they practice. Tr. at p. 409. Dr. Hopper is a PhD Psychologist, and runs 
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a licensed facility in Las Vegas. However, Olga argued Rule 702, which does not require a 
license, education, or degree, only that the witness have training, education, and/or 
experience sufficient to assist the fact finder with regard to the specialized issues. Tr. at p. 
410. Counsel herein argued Dr. Hopper was qualified to testify concerning the evaluation 
and treatment of M.G. and of the clinical testing that was administered to Olga by Dr. Jensen 
in connection to the custody evaluation. Tr. at pp. 410-411. 
B. The Trial Court's Exclusion of Dr. Hopper's Testimony Prejudiced the 
Outcome of the Trial. 
We note that "[t]he determination of whether there is a reasonable likelihood of a 
more favorable outcome is based upon a review of the record." Glacier Land Co., L.L.C. v. 
Claudia Klawe & Associates. L.L.C.. 2006 UT App. 516, ^[34, 154 P.3d 852 citing State v. 
Lindgren. 910 P.2d 1268, 1274 (Utah CtApp.1996). "This review requires the appellate court 
to determine from the record what evidence would have been before the jury absent the trial 
court's error." Id. citing Lindgren at 1274. 
Olga must demonstrate prejudice resulted from the trial court's error in excluding Dr. 
Hopper's testimony. As already insinuated herein, this matter was a close call and any further 
information regarding the best interests of the Child, which was within Dr. Hopper's 
purview, would have greatly aided the trial court in its determination of permanent custody. 
Therefore, as this Court reviews the record in this matter and determines what it would have 
been with Dr. Hopper's proffered testimony, Olga avers the outcome would have been 
tipped in her favor. 
The trial court relied upon Olga's objection to the use of Prozac for Michelle in his 
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determination the parties could not effectively communicate regarding decisions involving 
the Children. The trial court also found Robert seemed to be better situated to keep the lines 
of communication open. However, Dr. Hopper's testimony would have demonstrated Olga's 
sincere concern regarding Prozac, its dangerous effect on young children, how M.G. fared in 
Las Vegas away from the area in which she was integrated, and her favorable progress on 
GABA and other treatment. The trial court relied on the fact the Children's integration in the 
Provo area overcame Olga's ability and right to provide personal care, particularly as it 
related to M.G. Accordingly, Dr. Hopper would have given the trial court valuable insight as 
to how M.G.'s feeling of integration may have changed, in response to her time in Las Vegas. 
Through exclusion of Dr. Hopper's testimony, the trial court in essence left Dr. 
Jensen's testimony unrebutted and thus susceptible to being erroneously adopted in its 
entirety, as is argued supra. Allowing Dr. Hopper's testimony would not have worked to 
prejudice Robert's case since he had an expert to rebut the matter; however, exclusion of 
Olga's rebuttal witness became a crucial turning point of the trial in that the trial court did 
not maintain the discretion or authority to reject Dr. Jensen's testimony in light of no other 
evidence on the issues being presented. There was no weighing of the witnesses' opinions 
since only one was allowed to testify, making the case very one-sided. The prejudice heaped 
upon Olga through such exclusion is readily apparent. 
Ultimately, Hopper found Olga to be in a better situation than Robert, and Olga 
could adequately meet the needs of the Children in Las Vegas. However, the trial court 
refused to allow Olga to fully demonstrate this by excluding Dr. Hopper. Hence, not only 
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did the trial court commit error as argued supra but its error resulted in prejudice against Olga 
in the outcome of this matter. Therefore, this matter should be reversed. 
III. THE TRIAL COURT ERRED BY FAILING TO SUFFICIENTLY SET 
FORTH ITS FINDINGS CONCERNING ITS AGREEMENT WITH AND 
DEVIATION FROM DR. JENSEN'S REPORT. 
Dr. Jensen recommended Joint legal custody, and the Court rejected that 
recommendation, and further, restricted parent time. UT. CODE ANN. § 30-3-10.1 (1) defines 
"Joint legal custody" as follows: 
[T]he sharing of the rights, privileges, duties, and powers of a parent by both 
parents, where specified; (b) may include an award of exclusive authority by 
the court to one parent to make specific decisions; (c) does not affect the 
physical custody of the child except as specified in the order of joint legal 
custody; (d) is not based on awarding equal or nearly equal periods of physical 
custody of and access to the child to each of the parents, as the best interest of 
the child often requires that a primary physical residence for the child be 
designated; and (e) does not prohibit the court from specifying one parent as 
the primary caretaker and one home as the primary residence of the child. 
UT. CODE ANN. §30-3-10.1(2) defines "Joint physical custody" is as follows: 
[T]he child stays with each parent overnight for more than 30% of the year, 
and both parents contribute to the expenses of the child in addition to paying 
child support; (b) can mean equal or nearly equal periods of physical custody 
of and access to the child by each of the parents, as required to meet the best 
interest of the child; (c) may require that a primary physical residence for the 
child be designated; and (d) does not prohibit the court from specifying one 
parent as the primary caretaker and one home as the primary residence of the 
child. 
This Court has stated, "[w]e first note that child custody evaluations in divorce cases 
are specifically provided for by Rule 4-903, Utah Code of Judicial Administration (1990). The 
rule provides that the evaluator cshall submit a written report to the court,' and thereby 
clearly contemplates that such reports will be used in making custody determinations." 
Merriam v. Merriam. 799 P.2d 1172, 1175 (Utah App.,1990) (further citations omitted.) "In 
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divorce cases where custody is at issue, one evaluator may be appointed by the court to 
conduct an impartial and objective assessment of the parties and submit a written report to 
the court." UTAH CODE OF JUD.ADMIN.R. 4-903(4). The rule continues as follows: 
The purpose of the custody evaluation will be to provide the court with 
information it can use to make decisions regarding custody and parenting time 
arrangements that are in the child's best interest. This is accomplished by 
assessing the prospective custodians' capacity to parent, the developmental, 
emotional, and physical needs of the child, and the fit between each 
prospective custodian and child. Unless otherwise specified in the order, 
evaluators must consider and respond to each of the following factors: 
(5)(A) the child's preference; (5)(B) the benefit of keeping siblings 
together; (5)(C) the relative strength of the child's bond with one or 
both of the prospective custodians; (5)(D) the general interest in 
continuing previously determined custody arrangements where the 
child is happy and well adjusted; (5)(E) factors relating to the 
prospective custodians' character or status or their capacity or 
willingness to function as parents, including: (5)(E)(i) moral character 
and emotional stability; (5)(E)(ii) duration and depth of desire for 
custody; (5)(E)(iii) ability to provide personal rather than surrogate 
care; (5)(E)(iv) significant impairment of ability to function as a parent 
through drug abuse, excessive drinking or other causes; (5)(E)(v) 
reasons for having relinquished custody in the past; (5)(E)(vi) religious 
compatibility with the child; (5)(E)(vii) kinship, including in 
extraordinary circumstances stepparent status; (5)(E)(viii) financial 
condition; and (5)(E)(ix) evidence of abuse of the subject child, another 
child, or spouse; and (5)(F) any other factors deemed important by the 
evaluator, the parties, or the court. 
UTAH C O D E OF JUD.ADMIN.R. 4-903(5). 
In the instant case, the parties could not resolve the issue of custody themselves. In 
its fact-finding concerning custody, the trial court determined to diverge from Dr. Jensen's 
final recommendations, but adopted his findings and observations. R0560. Dr. Jensen 
testified that, in regard to the factor of the strength of attachment to the Children to their 
parents, Dr. Jensen found this to be a nondifferientiating criteria. Tr. at pp. 283-284. Dr. 
Jensen evaluated the general interest of continuing the previously determined custody 
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arrangement and found the Children's integration in the Provo area was the most important 
factor and central to the Children's adjustment Tr. at pp. 284-285. Dr. Jensen additionally 
testified that, (A) concerning M.G. and her need for treatment, there was concern with 
having two (2) different treating professionals in the two (2) different areas in which the 
Children lived; (B) there were hiccups in the communication between Cannon and Dr. 
Hopper and they were not necessarily unified in their approach to treatment; (C) proximity 
of residence that preserves the Children's integration is clearly in the best interest of the 
Children; (D) Olga had the slight advantage over Robert in her ability to provide personal 
care to the Children; and (E) he based his recommendation the Children stay in Provo on 
more than the desires of the Children, specifically that they are integrated there. R.0694 at 
pp. 287-288, 290-291, 299, 334. Dr. Jensen testified it was a very close case. R.0694 at p. 343. 
Dr. Jensen ultimately recommended Joint legal custody with Robert designated the 
primary residential parent. Dr. Jensen testified he hoped M.G. could remain in therapy with 
Cannon; however, a change occurred but did not impact his custody recommendations. 
R.0694 p. 320. 
Dr. Jensen recommended the parties share joint custody, where Olga and Robert 
would share the rights, privileges, duties, and powers of a parent. UT. CODE ANN. §30-3-
10.1(1). However, the trial court granted sole physical and legal custody to Robert indicating 
it was based on Dr. Jensen's custody evaluation, but failed to make any specific findings on 
the variance of declining to order joint legal custody. 
Dr. Jensen was presumed to have conducted an impartial and objective assessment of 
the parties, and he submitted his resulting written report to the trial court. CODE OF 
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JUD.ADMIN.R. 4-903(4). Dr. Jensen was required to consider a myriad of factors in his 
report, some of which he found to be nondifferientiating and others to weigh in favor of a 
party, as already described herein. However, in arriving at its conclusion regarding custody, 
the trial court did not make any findings regarding the reason for variance, even though it 
determined to adopt Dr. Jensen's findings. See, R0560. 
While UTAH CODE OF JUD.ADMIN.R. 4-903(5) does not bind a trial court to an 
evaluation report, the report is presumed to be relied on by a trial court in making its custody 
determination, particularly since the evaluator must perform an impartial and objective 
assessment of the parties. See, UTAH CODE OFjUD.ADMIN.R. 4-903 (4). Accordingly, the trial 
court's failure to make specific findings as to its divergence from Dr. Jensen's 
recommendation that the parties share legal custody constituted error in light of the weight 
afforded to custody evaluator reports. Thus, the award of sole physical and legal custody to 
Robert should be reversed. 
IV. THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IMPOSING RESTRICTIVE PARENT TIME 
AND REJECTING DR. JENSEN'S VISITATION RECOMMENDATION 
This Court has stated, "[w]hen the parents cannot agree on a visitation arrangement, 
the Utah Code delineates minimum parent-time schedules." Trubetzkoy v. Trubetzkoy. 2009 
UT App. 77, f l4,205 citing UTAH C O D E ANN. §30-3-35(2). 
The minimum schedule for parent-time for children 5-18 years of age is outlined 
under UT. CODE ANN. §§ 30-3-35 and 30-3-37(5). In Udy v. Udy. this Court analyzed a trial 
court's award of expanded visitation under statute to the noncustodial parent. Ibid., 893 P.2d 
1097, 1101 (Utah App.,1995). The custodial parent appealed, arguing the trial court had 
abused its discretion; however, the court determined the appellant had not presented 
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evidence to rebut the testimony of experts who recommended the schedule. Id. In this case, 
the Court amended the schedule, and did not explain why neither the statutory scheme nor 
the evaluator's recommendation was followed. 
Dr. Jensen ultimately recommended at trial that the parties be awarded Joint Legal 
Custody, (A) the Children remain in Provo and continue to reside with Robert; (B) Olga 
received holiday visits and frequent parent-time with the Children, but to avoid full 
Summers; and (C) half-summer visits with Olga occur. Tr. at pp. 310-312. Dr. Jensen 
testified he was deviating from the standard visitation schedule as his proposed schedule 
would provide predictability, long term scheduling and longevity. Tr. at p. 318. Dr. Jensen 
testified he hoped M.G. could remain in therapy with Cannon; however, a change occurred 
but did not impact his custody recommendations. By the time of trial, Cannon had left 
Provo and moved to Salt Lake City. Tr. at p. 320. Jensen recommended that Olga get seven 
(7) weeks in the summer, holidays and one visit per month. See exhibit "A." 
In its divergence from Dr. Jensen's recommendations, the trial court ordered: Robert 
to have the following holidays every year: Martin Luther King weekend; Spring Break; 
Pioneer Day, and; Labor Day Weekend. Olga to have the following holidays every year: 
President's Day weekend; Memorial Day weekend; Independence Day, and; Fall Break. 
Robert was awarded Thanksgiving in odd numbered years and Christmas break in even 
numbered years. Olga was awarded Thanksgiving in even numbered years and awarded 
Christmas in odd numbered years. Olga was awarded summer parent time beginning every 
year the day after Father's Day and ending July 23rd at 9:00 p.m. Order at pp. 3-4. 
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Based on the parties' visitation disagreements, the trial court was required to apply a 
minimum parent-time schedule. Trubetzkoy at ^[14. However, the trial court granted 
substantially restricted parent time and failed to specify why he was doing so. In fact, the 
Court said: "substantial parent time should be awarded to the non-custodial parent." 
Although the trial Court gave Olga less than half of the statutory parent time, he apparentiy 
felt like he had given her an expanded parent time role. 
Simply put, Utah Code §30-3-37(5) provides "...the minimum requirements for 
parent-time with a school-age child." The trial court gave less and failed to explain why. 
V. THE TRIAL COURT ERRED BY FAILING TO IMPOSE SANCTIONS FOR 
ROBERT'S CONTEMPT OF COURT. 
Robert was found in contempt of Court on three separate occasions. In each 
finding of contempt, the Court reserved the issue of sanctions (with the exception of an 
"order" to comply with a prior "order" by paying a reduced sum of $175 per month), and 
attorney's fees were reserved for trial. At trial, sanctions and attorney's fees were summarily 
denied on the grounds that Robert could not afford to pay. Robert now defends the trial 
courts ruling, directing this Court to §30-3-3(1) and the "Jones factors." Robert fails to even 
address Olga's claims pursuant to the long standing policy of our Courts to impose sanctions 
to enforce compliance with our Courts' orders. Robert cites Utah Code 30-3-3(1), as support 
for the Trial Court's decision. The proper authority is Utah Code §30-3-3(2), and the 
authority in Appellant's principal brief. 
In January, 2008, this Court decided the case of Anderson v. Thompson, in which it 
was stated as follows: 
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Because of Husband's noncompliance with multiple provisions 
of the Decree, the trial court held Husband in contempt of 
court and awarded judgment to Wife in the amount of $ 44,311. 
In addition, the trial court awarded Wife $ 7652.97 in attorney 
fees based on the court's finding that 'attorney fees are justified 
and necessary and reasonable.' Husband appealed. This Court 
reversed the finding of Attorney's fees because the "trial court 
did not enter sufficient findings on the reasonableness of Wife's 
attorney fees or Wife's need for such fees. 
Ibid., 2008 UT App 3, 176 P3d 464. The analysis of this Court was referenced as 
having been based not on the contempt statute or case law, but instead on UTAH CODE 
ANN. §30-3-3(1), which provides that a trial court "may order a party to pay the costs, 
attorney fees, and witness fees . . . of the other party to enable the other party to prosecute or 
defend the action." Id. at 475. This is the wrong standard for Contempt sanctions. 
Even if this Court adopts the discretionary function of the Judge under §30-3-3(2), 
the Trial Court made no finding of Robert's impecuniosity. Olga also testified Robert had 
been working two (2) jobs at the time she filed for divorce but had quit one (1) subsequent 
to filing. Tr. at p. 100. Robert was resourceful in obtaining help for the Children's care and 
assistance from various outside sources to make up the difference between what he was 
earning and what was needed to provide for their family. Tr. at pp. 138-139. Robert would 
rely on Olga's income so he could work less and still rely in welfare assistance to make ends 
meet. Tr. at pp. 148-149. Robert was capable of manipulating his income. 
The trial court ultimately determined Robert was unable to pay. R0648. However, 
such determination was against evidence presented at trial, summarily that Robert 
purposefully relies on welfare to make ends meet and does have the ability to pay Olga's 
attorney's fees, particularly since he had worked two (2) jobs throughout the marriage. This 
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Court needs to make a determination whether impecuniosity is a "free pass" to commit 
contempt and refuse to comply with the Court's orders, or whether the "Jones Factors" are 
required to find contempt under §30-3-3(2), as implied in Anderson. 
VI. APPELLANT HAS PROPERLY MARSHALED THE EVIDENCE. 
In point 7 of his brief, Robert claims that the Olga has failed to marshal the evidence 
in support of the trial courts' decisions. Pursuant to Rule 24(a)(9), a party challenging the trial 
courts' finding of fact must marshal all record evidence which supports the challenged 
finding. Olga has met this burden, although the marshaling of the evidence may not be 
mandated in this case since her challenges on appeal are directed at conclusions of law. In 
this case, Olga properly summarized the testimony of each and every witness in both pretrial 
proceedings and the trial itself, summarized all documentary evidence as it related to the 
findings of the Court, and provided the trial courts' findings in connection therewith. 
Robert cannot and does not specify one single fact which he believes supports the 
trial courts' decision that Olga did not touch upon. Olga's challenges pertain to the improper 
application of the custody factors analysis, specifically as it relates to the weight to be given 
to various elements. While Robert claims the trial court was exhaustive in its analysis of the 
primary care taker of the Children, he ignores the fact that this was found by all to be a 
traditional household, with the father as the primary bread winner and the mother as the 
primary care provider for the Children [Brief p. 27, 28 ]. 
Olga provided a comprehensive statement of facts to this Court and has fully satisfied 
her obligation to marshal the evidence. Robert's claim otherwise should be rejected and a 
determination made on the merits of the issues. 
20 
VI. THE ISSUE OF CHILD SUPPORT IS PROPERLY 
BEFORE THIS COURT. 
Olga claims that the trial court erroneously refused to adopt and utilize the "low 
income table" set forth in UTAH CODE ANN. §78b-12-302. Robert claims that Olga failed to 
property preserve or raise the issue of child support in connection with this action. R. 0621 
see TJ 9. Attached hereto as exhibit "B". However, Olga raised the issue of child support 
below in both her Petition and Complaint for Divorce, which requested reasonable child support, 
and her July 29, 2008, filing of a Motion to Alter, Amend or Supplement Findings of Fact and 
Conclusions ofYjzw, arguing the trial court failed to consider statutory issues relating to child 
support. Robert's claims of failure to preserve the issue are thus flawed. 
The Utah Child support act provides, in part: 
§78B-12-205. Calculation of obligations. 
(1) Each parent's child support obligation shall be established in 
proportion to their adjusted gross incomes, unless the low 
income table is applicable../9 
(2) Except in cases . . . where the obligor's adjusted gross 
income is $1,050 or less monthly, the base child support award 
shall be determined as follows: (sub (a) and (b) omitted as not 
applicable). 
(4) In cases where the monthly adjusted gross income of either 
parent is between $650 and $1.050. the base child support award 
shall be the lesser of the amount calculated in accordance with 
Subsection (2) and the amount calculated using the low income 
table. If the income and number of children is found in an area 
of the low income table in which no amount is shown, the base 
combined child support obligation table is to be used. 
(Emphasis added) 
This Court determined Olga's income at the time of the trial to be $623.04 per 
month, to which she objected based upon the analysis given by the trial court, and indicated 
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that the proper computation was $539.70 per month. This claim was rejected by the Trial 
Court and is not appealed here. 
The primary issue is whether or not the Court should have utilized the "low income 
tables contained at UTAH CODE ANN. §78b-12-302. By it's express terms, -302 applies to 
"the obligor parent only" in the event the obligor parent currently earns less that $1050 per 
month for the purpose of child support. Olga filed a motion to alter, amend or supplement 
the trial courts' findings and conclusions requesting recalculation of child support. Following 
the Court's ruling on that Order, Appellant sent a letter to the Court on March 19, 2009, [R. 
622] and attached a formal objection to the proposed order [R. 621] specifically referencing 
the Courts failure to adopt the low income tables of §78b-12-302, which should have 
resulted in a child support obligation of $31 per month. On or about March 20, 2009, the 
Court issued a signed minute entry wherein the Court declined to make further changes, but 
noted that the remaining issues were "resolved by the incorporation of its Memorandum 
Decision by reference." [p.24 P. 9] [R. 0624, 0625]. However, the trial courts' Memorandum 
Decision only references the issue of joint physical and legal custody of the Children and 
parent time. The trial court failed to ever consider the issue of the adjustment of child 
support and the use of the low income tables, despite that fact having been directly being 
brought to its attention. 
VII. APPELLEE FAILED TO ADEQUATELY PRESERVE HIS ISSUES 
THROUGH CROSS-APPEAL IN THIS MATTER. 
Appellee claims the trial court erred in failing to "impute income" to Olga, or in the 
alternative, by failing to calculate some or all of the income of her husband to her as income 
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for the purpose of calculating child support. Robert seems to be making an affirmative claim, 
which should have been brought by cross-appeal. 
Robert raised this issue at the trial of the case. R. 0694 p. 0493. Robert now tries to 
advance this exact issue on appeal. 
Robert filed no affirmative claim, filed no cross-appeal under UT. R. APP. P. 4(d), but 
now seeks to overturn the trial court's ruling on his issue. Any request for affirmative relief, 
which is not merely offered as a ground for affirming the trial court, is not properly before 
the Court unless a proper cross-appeal has been filed. Since this affirmative issue is not 
properly before the Court, Olga will decline the invitation to brief this issue. The only error 
committed by the Court was in failing to adopt the statutory scheme, as argued supra. 
VIII. THE APPEAL IS N O RENDERED MOOT BY THE TEMPORARY 
ORDERS ISSUED IN THE MOTHER'S PETITION TO MODIFY. 
A father makes the claim that the appeal is moot as a result of a Stipulation reached 
by the Parties for a Temporary Order during the pendency of Petition to Modify, this results 
from the mother moving from Las Vegas to Provo, and the father's denial of visitation 
because it was not provided for in the Custody Decree. He adds very litde analysis. It is 
interesting to note that the Order attached to the brief is not even the current Order in effect 
in this case. See Attached as exhibit "C." 
"This Court has stated that an issue only becomes moot when the requested judicial 
relief can not effect the rights of the litigants." Winters v. Schulman, 1999 UT App. 119; 977 
P.2d 1218. The issue in this case is not moot for multiple reasons. First, the Decree of 
Divorce is still in effect providing for a specific schedule of visitation if the mother resides in 
Las Vegas, Nevada. Second, the current Order in effect is "Temporary." Third, the Order 
23 
only alters local visitation under Utah Code § 30-3-35. Finally, even if the requested relief 
were deemed to render moot the issue of visitation or custody, or be seen as a waiver of 
custody, this case would constitute an exception to the general rule governing mootness.2 
For example, this issue has already arisen without remedy in Hansen and Larsen, saved only 
by this Court affirming the trial court decisions. 
This case presents an issue that effects virtually every contested custody case to heard 
in the future. Should this Court decide that the Court wrongfully decided the issue of 
custody, and that custody should be transferred to the mother, mother would not be granted 
non-custodial parent time pursuant to § 30-3-35, as she would be designated the custodial 
parent. Finally, a change in custody by this court, or a remand, would constitute a substantial 
and material change upon which the Order for Temporary Parent Time had been granted, 
and would justify a re-evaluation at the Trial Court of that issue as well. 
In the alternative, a remand in light of the general change in circumstances of the 
Parties, with the Petitioner now residing in the same neighborhood the Parties occupied at 
the time of the separation, should justify a remand and redetermination of the issues of 
custody, joint custody , and parent time. 
2
 Exceptions to mootness include that the issue is one of wide public concern, and because of 
the short period any one litigant is affected by it, the issue is "'capable of repetition yet evading review.'" 
Id.; see also KUTV v. Conder, 668 P.2d 513, 516 (Utah 1983); Wickham v. Fisher, 629 P.2d 896, 899-900 
(Utah 1981). 
~>A 
CONCLUSION 
WHEREFORE, based upon the foregoing, Olga respectfully requests t at this Cc urt 
reverse the Order in this matter and take any such further action as this Court de us neo ss ry. 
DATED this 27* day of July, 2010. 
'G. Clark, Attorney t Law 
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1 availability without a, making the children a, suffer the 
2 consequences of that, which is very difficult to do without 
3 residences being close to one another. And so a, I, some 
4 of that is a moving target because a, there is some 
5 uncertainty about the sacrifices that parents are willing to 
6 make a, when it really, when the rubber hits the road 
7 literally. And a, with accelerated gas prices, the distance 
8 between homes can sometimes be monumental a, in terms of 
9 costs to families. 
10 Q. Who would, who would have the greater ability in 
11 this case to a, to pay for a, or be able to afford the a, the 
12 a, cost of the gas and the trips to visit the children? 
13 A. Certainly Olga and Tom have the greater financial 
14 ability. But I also appreciated Tom's a, history of a, 
15 employment, that he's established himself effectively, and a, 
16 that the possibility, the ease of moving at the time, the 
17 ease of his moving away from his career or, career and what 
18 he had developed there was also not a very good option a, 
19 for him in order to reestablish a residence here and continue 
20 his employment without being on the road traveling all the 
21 time. 
22 Q. Okay. So it would be your recommendation then 
23 that the children remain here in Provo. Is that correct? 
24 A. That's correct. 
25 Q. And, and that they reside principally with their 
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1 father? 
2 A. Yes. 
3 Q. And, and in terms of parent time for Olga a, what 
4 a, what would you recommend in that regard? Specifically. 
5 If you can be as specific as possible regarding that^ 
6 recommendation. 
7 A. I think to take care, I think a, to take care of 
8 maintaining regularity of contact, to try and build a contact 
9 around red lettered holidays for her to travel to see the 
10 children. To be careful about a, full summers away, a, that 
11 tends to prioritize the children's relationships with 
12 parents over their children's integration and development of 
13 skills and involvements in the community. 
14 A lot of kids a, when they, as they get older they 
15 have more and more involvements which they have to 
16 sacrifice. And a, here we have a number of daughters who it 
17 will be particularly important for them to have a, 
18 opportunities to build skills and value themselves in a, in 
19 various areas of their interests. 
20 Sometimes a, when we create parent time 
21 arrangements in the summer we still make the kids make all 
22 the sacrifices. And I would, I discourage people from doing 
23 that a, because of the, in the name of their relationship 
24 with parents. 
25 Q. So, so you don't recommend that we engage in a 
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2 that— 
3 A. I do not. 
4 Q. — what I you saying? 
5 What, what do you recommend for these children in 
6 terms of parent time during the summer? 
7 A. I'd say half the summer and a, and try and build 
8 more frequent parent time throughout the year for frequent 
9 regularity of contact. Take advantage of red letter 
10 holidays. Encourage the kids to stay a, up in school, 
11 perform well in school so that they can be withdrawn from 
12 school to expand time. Support the kids in their education 
13 in both homes a, so that when they do leave a, for periods of 
14 time their education will be supported. And a, confer 
15 regularly with teachers a, to make sure work is in, and be, 
16 for both parents to be really involved with the schools. 
17 Q. Okay. Would you also recommend that for this, this 
18 summer that's just beginning? 
19 A. Well, I would. The other problem that occurs 
20 when a, when we, with... The problem with visitation 
21 generally is it creates artificial experiences. We, we 
22 often create a parent nonparent phenomenon where the kids 
23 come to idealize a parent in a nonparental role. This is 
24 what it would be like if I lived here, we would be having 
25 fun, it would be in the summer, I'm not stressed, I'm not 
1 in school a, and my parents are not working, we're 
2 maximizing our time together, we're having a lot of fun, so 
3 on and so forth. But the reality of it is if there was a 
4 flipflop thing they would experience that parent and 
5 themselves under the stress of school, following through with 
6 homework, and the parent having to a, take time with them 
7 during work time. And so those issues a, are dangerous for 
8 creating in children an artificial understanding of real 
9 families* 
10 9. I notice on page 29 of your, this is in the actual 
11
 a, recommendation itself, you indicate that you recommend the 
12 children spend the entire period to commence the day after 
13 Father's Day until the children return to Utah, or 1 guess 
14 the start of the school year, that they spend that with 
15 jfoeir mother. Is that correct? Is that what your 
16 recommendation is? 
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 nA. Yes. 
18 Q. Why did you, why did you set it up that way? Why, 
19 why do you think that's better for the children? Or is that 
20 just an arbitration designation on your part? 
21 A. I think they're young enough now to do it. But it 
22 creates a discomfort that it's a pattern that's established 
23 permanently a, that as they, as they become teens, a, that 
24 it's, it's really sacrificial a, to, to create schedules like 
25 the one that's proposed here. 
1 Q. That it is or is not sacrificial? 
2 A. It is sacrificial in the long-term to have the full 
3 summer with, in one environment away from friends. Itfs 
4 disintegrating. 
5 Q. I understand that. I'm just, I'm asking, you set 
6 up, you recommend a specific schedule for the summer where 
7 the father would have the children until the day after 
8 Father's Day and then they go down to Las Vegas to be with 
9 the mother. Do you see where I'm reading— 
10 A. Uh-huh (affirmative). 
11 Q. — on page 29? 
12 A. That, that gives a slightly briefer period with the 
13 father a, in that summer. 
14 Q. And would you recommend that that be, that that 
15 period be the same every single year that a, that we not have 
16 a, a flexible summer schedule but that the children have that 
17 same schedule every year? 
18 A. I don't like those kind of schedules because a, 
19 they ignore the children's a, needs and wants and changes to 
20 the family in terms of making it permanent. But I 
21 understand the need a, and the requirement of them in order 
22 to come back to court to modify a schedule. 
23 Q. Well, do you think it would minimize conflict 
24 between the parties if there was a fixed schedule for summer 
25 visitation? 
1 A. By all means it would, yes. 
2 Q. Would, would that outweigh the flexibility in this 
3 case? 
4 A. Yes. I don't want to organize them into 
5 conflict. I... At the same time I, I would make an appeal 
6 to them to, to listen to their kids and, and their kids needs 
7 with respect to things. 
8 THE JUDGE: Counsel, we*re at a time to take a 
9 break. Why don't... Let's take a break, you can assess 
10 where you are then wrap it up and Mr. Clark can cross after a 
11 10 minute break. 
12 (Recess) 
13 THE JUDGE 
14 MR. BLACK 
15 THE JUDGE 
Please be seated. 
I'll go retrieve him. 
Thanks. Go ahead. 
16 Q. (MR. BLACK:) We were discussing I think before 
17 we left a, the summer parent time that you would recommend 
18 for the children in this case. And a, I think it was, 
19 correct me if I'm wrong, but I think it was your 
20 recommendation that the children spend a, the summer until 
-
21 the day after Father's Day with their father in Utah. Is 
22 that correct? 
23 A. (THE WITNESS:) That's correct. 
24 Q. And then that they go with their mother after that 
25 for the rest of the summer? 
0315 
1 A. Yes. 
2 Q. At the end of the summer what would be your 
3 recommendation regarding when the children should be 
4 returned? The day before school? The week before school? 
5 A, A week before school, at least a few days before 
6 school so that a, they can sort of... It's a good idea to 
7 get back in time for them to go into the school, meet 
8 their teachers. Usually the school calendar gives that day 
9 a, identifies that day. That would be the date I would have 
10 them at least the day before that day that they go to school 
11 to meet the teachers and— 
12 Q. Okay. And, and you also had said in, in your 
13 recommendation that a, Robert would, should be permitted to 
14 schedule two consecutive uninterrupted weeks of parent time 
15 with the children each summer. Is that correct? 
16 I guess, I guess my question in that regard is a, 
17 do you anticipate that the court would have interrupted 
18 parent time from the beginning of summer until Father's Day 
19 or not? 
20 A. Well, and it would be difficult to do a, and meet 
21 the requirements of this statement actually. Because a, 
22 if the children were to go after, after Father's Day then 
23 they will not have been out of school for a full a, two... 
24 Okay. 
25 Q. I guess, I guess— 
1 A, No. 
2 Q. — my confusion i s — 
3 A. I was thinking four. I was thinking in terms of 
4 statute. So no, that's consistent. They would have two 
5 consecutive uninterrupted weeks of parent time— 
6 Q. In addition to that first half of the summer or as 
- ^
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7 part of that first half of the summer? 
8 A. I think a, as part of that first half thatthat 
9 time would be uninterrupted time. 
10 Q. Okay. So that entire time would be uninterrupted? 
11 A. Yes. 
12 Q. What about Mother's Day? 
13 A. Mother's Day— 
14 Q. Oh, that would be before the end of the summer. 
15 A. — typically takes place in May. 
16 Q. My mistake. 
17 A. Right. 
18 Q. Okay. So you don't and anticipate there will by 
19 interruptions during that first half of the summer— 
20 A. No. 
21 Q. — for the mother to come visit? 
22 A. No. And I don't anticipate, I mean, I believe 
23 that a, I believe the kids would handle the schedule pretty 
24 well of, of what would basically amount to four weeks, close 
25 to four weeks with Dad of summer parent time. Of course, 
1 this year it would have only been three, about three. And a^ 
2 and then the remainder with, with the mother would be 
3 another seven weeks. I think they'll handle seven, seven 
4 weeks without parent time a, away from Mr F^ t-hpr i s finp. 
5 Q. Okay. Do you... Specifically holidays I noticed 
6 on page 28 you, you indicated certain holidays that a, and 
7 your division of holidays. 
8 Have you followed the standard a, out-of-state 
9 parent schedule for those holidays that you've specified or 
10 have you deviated somewhat from those? 
11 A. Well, I attempted to persuade the legislature this 
12 past legislative session to fix the holidays and rather than 
13 rotating them so that a, because they can be rather equally 
14 distributed for parents. 
15 So that's what you have here is a fixing of the 
16 holidays a, in accordance with, you know, to, so they 
17 wouldn't have to a, rotate them. And it's rather arbitrary 
18 with the exception of how complimentary they are to one 
19 another. 
20 Q. And, and the reason, just for the court's sake, 
21 what reason would you give for deviating from the standard 
22 schedule in this case? 
23 A. Predictability, long-term scheduling and 
24 longevity. The longevity of fixed holidays allows parents 
25 a, to have holidays you're always going to have. And when 
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Honorable James R. Taylor 
Fourth Judicial Center 
125 North 100 West 
Provo, Utah 84601 
Re: Grindstaff v. Grindstaff, 4th District Civil No.^64402197 \ 
Your Honor. 
Your research clerk called and asked if we had any objections to the Documents prepared 
by Mr- Black. Rather than filing post judgment motions or proceedings after the documents are 
signed, we are providing our objections herewith. 
I thank you for the opportunity to attempt to resolve these issues before the final Orders 
are entered in this case. 
Sincerel; 
JAKIES G. CLARK 
utorney at Law 
enclosure 
cc: Attorney Guy Black 
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JAMES G. CLARK, USB #3637 
Attorney for Petitioner 
43 East 200 North 
Provo, UT 84606 
Telephone: (801) 375-1717 
Facsimile: (801)375-1172 
IN THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT, IN AND FOR 
UTAH COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
OLGA LUCIA GRINDSTAFF ] 
Petitioner, ] 
ROBERT LEE GRINDSTAFF, 
Respondent. 
> OBJECTION TO RESPONDENT'S 
) PROPOSED ORDER 
) Civil No. 064402197 
) Judge Taylor 
COMES NOW the Petitioner, by and through counsel James G. Clark, and hereby objects 
to the Proposed Order prepared by the Respondent in connection with the Trial and the Hearing 
heard on or about January 30,2009. Petitioner provides the following objections. 
FINDINGS OF FACT AND CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
1. Paragraph 2 Respondent refers to the Petitioner (Olga Grindstaff) as "hereinafter 
Mr. Grindstaff." See Paragraph 2. 
2. Mr. Grindstaff has not remarried as of the time of the trial, also an apparent 
drafting error in paragraph 2. 
3. Paragraph 3 lists the Petitioner as "(hereinafter "Mrs. Bradley")." This is correct, 
but does not track with the case heading and style, which lists the Petitioner as Olga Lucia 
Grindstaff. 
3 A U- 2b 
4. On page 3, line 1, the word "that" should be "than." 
5. Paragraph 14 imputes income to Olga based on the average of her last two years 
gross reported income "which is, for child support purposes, 623.04 per month." Her income ft# 
2006 was 6619.80 and for 2007 was 6333.10 per paragraph 13. The average is therefore 6476.45 
/12 « $539.70 per month (call it $540). 
6. Paragraph 15 is still incorrect. Olga has three children living at home with her, an 
adult daughter and 14 year old son from a prior relationship, and an infant child from her present 
marriage. The second sentence references "another child petitioner had from a prior 
relationship..." This creates the impression that Juan, the 14 year old child, does not reside with 
his mother. He does. 
7. The calculations of Paragraph 18 are incorrect, as per paragraph 14fs incorrect 
figures. The present family credit should be $33.00. 
8. Total family income in Paragraph 19 should be $3,283.00 
9. Per Paragraph 19, child support under the standard tables would be $165.00, but 
Olga's income falls into the low income tables of §78B-12-302, resulting in a child support 
obligation of $30 / month, per the statutory and administrative guidelines of sectjon^302^ 
10. Paragraph 21 adopts Dr. Jensen's recommendations for Parent time "for the most 
part," but the court expressly has rejected both the joint custody recommendation and the parent 
time recommendation which was testified to by Dr. Jensen. 
11. The specific Order of the Court failed to adopt the parent time statutes set forth in 
Utah Code §30-3-35 and §30-3-37. Section 30-3-34 sets forth a presumption: "The advisory 
guidelines as provided in Section 30-3-33 and the parent-time schedule as provided in Sections 
30-3-35 and 30-3-35.5 shall be presumed to be in the best interests of the child." While 
presumptions can be rebutted, the proposed findings fail to adopt a factual analysis to reject the 
statutory presumption. 
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
12. The conclusions of law should likewise be amended in paragraph 19 to provide 
for statutory support in the amount of $30 per month. 
13. Paragraph 22 imposes the cost and obligation of transporting the children for 
parent time purposes on the mother, Petitioner. However, the findings of fact do not specify that 
the factors of §30-3-37(4)(a) - (d), which are required findings by the Court. 
FINAL ORDER 
1. The final Order contains a provision in paragraph 15 that Olga is entitled to parent 
time with the children if she is in Utah "assuming it does not interfere with Mr. GrindstafFs time 
with the children. This provision is ambiguous and is not supported by the Findings of Fact and 
Conclusions of Law set forth above. 
2. The child support amount set forth in Paragraph 20 is not consistent with the 
statutory child support guidelines, as set forth above. 
DATED AND SIGNED this (j_ day of March, 2009. 
JAMBS G. CLARK 
Attorney for Olga Grindstaff 
3 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I hereby certify that I served a true and correct copy of the above and foregoing document 
as follows: ^ 
_^mailed a true and correct copy of (he foregoing first class postage prepaid and 
addressed as follows; or 
hand-delivered to the following: or 
sent by facsimile to the following: 
GUY L. BLACK 
1840 N. State Street, Ste 200 
Provo, UT 84604 
DATED AND SIGNED this XL day of March, 2009. if t» 
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GUY L. BLACK, No. 6182 
GREENWOOD & BLACK 
Attorneys for Respondent 
1840 North State Street, Suite 200 
Provo, Utah 84604 
Telephone (801)377-4652 
Facsimile- (801) 377-4673 
IN THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF UTAH COUNTY 
STATE OF UTAH 
OLGA LUCIA GRINDSTAFF AMENDED ORDER ON MOTION FOR 
TEMPORARY ORDERS 
Petitioner, 
Civil No 064402197 
vs. 
Judge: Taylor 
ROBERT LEE GRINDSTAFF, Commissioner. Patton 
Respondent. 
This matter came before the Court, Commissioner Thomas Patton presiding, on 
November 30, 2009. Petitioner was present and represented by counsel, James G. Clark. 
Respondent was present and represented by counsel, Guy L. Black The parties reached an 
agreement regarding the Motion in this matter. The parties' agreement was stated by counsel on 
the record, and each party consented on the record Based upon the parties' agreement, and good 
cause appearing, it is HEREBY ORDERED AS FOLLOWS. 
1. Respondent, Robert Lee GrindstafT, shall retain physical and legal custody of the 
parties' minor children. 
2. Except as otherwise set forth in this order, Petitioner, Olga Lucia Bradley, shall be 
QRmmi 
entitled to parent time with the parties' minor children in accordance with Section 30-3-35, Utah 
Code Annotated. 
3. The Petitioner may participate in the children's school activities and functions, 
provided she does so appropriately and without interference with the children's education or 
activities. 
4. For the next sixty (60) days, from November 30, 2009 through January 31, 2010, 
the Petitioner's parent-time shall be altered somewhat, as follows: 
a. During that sixty-day period, in lieu of Petitioner's midweek visit, the 
Petitioner shall have the children on Tuesday, Wednesday, and Thursday evening 
from the time the children are dropped off at the Petitioner's house, as specified in 
paragraph 4.c, infra, until 8:00 p.m. 
b. During that sixty-day period, Petitioner shall deliver the children to 
Respondent's home ward for church services at the beginning of those services, 
and shall retrieve the children from Respondent's home ward at the end of those 
services. The children shall attend church services in Respondent's home ward 
every Sunday. 
c. The parties' children participate in an after-school program each day after 
school. Notwithstanding the foregoing parent-time schedule, Petitioner's parent 
time shall commence only after all of the children have finished their after-school 
program. If all of the children have finished the after-school program by 4:00 
p.m., then the Respondent shall deliver the children to Petitioner's home at that 
- 2 -
time. If the children have not all finished the after-school program by 4:00 p.m., 
then the Respondent shall deliver the children to the Petitioner's home after all the 
children are finished at 5:30 p.m During Petitioner's midweek visit(s), Petitioner 
shall return the children to Respondent's home at 8:00 p.m. During other visits, 
Petitioner shall return the children to Respondent's home at the time specified in 
Section 30-3-35, Utah Code Annotated. 
5. Unless the parties agree otherwise in writing, beginning January 31, 2010 the 
provisions of paragraph 4 of this order shall no longer apply, and the additional midweek visits 
and Sunday church attendance shall automatically cease. Thereafter, Petitioner will have to elect 
the pick-up time and day as set forth in Utah Code §30-3-35(2)(a), et seq. 
6. The parties shall participate in mediation. Petitioner's attorney shall attempt to 
schedule mediation through the Utah Court of Appeals. If he is unable to obtain the Court of 
Appeals' services for mediation, then mediation shall be conducted by Sandra Dredge, unless the 
parties agree on the use of some other mediator. 
